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In this paper, we develop a quantum key distribution protocol based on the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger states (GHZs). The particles are exchanged among the users in blocks
through two steps. In this protocol, for three-particle GHZs three keys can be simultaneously
generated. The advantage of this is that the users can select the most suitable key for
communication. The protocol can be generalized to N users to provide N keys. The protocol
has two levels for checking the eavesdroppers. Moreover, we discuss the security of the
protocol against different attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is one of the most fruitful applications in the quantum information
theory and it could be widely used in the near future [1]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is
one of the main interest in the quantum cryptography, which is defined as a procedure allowing
two or many legitimate users of a communication channel to establish two or many exact copies.
This will be in the form of one copy for each user, of a random and secret sequence of bits. The
advantage of the quantum cryptography over the classical one lies in the following. The former
follows the quantum laws, e.g., the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, no-cloning theorem and the
quantum correlations, to protect the distribution of the cryptographic keys. Therefor, the message
and the key are secure since the legitimate users can easily detect the eavesdroppers. This in turn
encourages the researchers to develop new protocols. Most of these protocols follow the original
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2three constructs, namely, the BB84 protocol [2], the B92 protocol [3] and the EPR protocol [4].
The QKD has been experimentally demonstrated by different means as shown, e.g., in [5].
Entanglement is one of the main ingredients in the quantum information theory [6]. Based
on this property, various protocols have been developed. For instance, Ekert has introduced his
famous protocol which makes two remote parties share a private secure key [4]. The quantum
direct communication protocol has been described in [7]. The ”ping-pong” protocol has been given
to achieve deterministic direct communication between the legitimate users [8]. This protocol has
advantages and disadvantages; it allows the transmission of either a secret key or the plaintext
message. Nevertheless, it is insecure (quasi-secure) if it is operating in a noisy (perfect quantum)
channel [9]. In these protocols, the Einstein-Polosky-Rosen state (EPR) has been used to distribute
the quantum-cryptographic key. The security has been checked either by the violation of the Bell
inequalities [10] or by the correlation of the EPR. Furthermore, Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states
(GHZs) [11] have been already involved in the quantum cryptography [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. These states are distinguished by a large Hilbert space compared to the EPR.
Precisely, in the GHZs protocols one can have two or more legitimate users. In the two users
case, the distribution of the GHZs particles and the quantum states are asymmetrical between
Alice and Bob. Additionally, the security can be established via the correlation of the GHZ triplet
state , e.g., [15]. Nevertheless, in the multi-user case, say three users, there are sender, receiver
and supervisor, who controls the entanglement and information transmission between the sender
and the receiver, e.g., [13, 19, 21]. The users can get the key only by joint cooperation. In this
respect, the protocol is secure against the dishonest user (if he or she exists) [13]. The GHZs have
been used in the quantum secure direct communication [17, 22] and in the teleportation [16, 19].
It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous quantum direct comminution between users based
on the GHZs has been developed in [20] . Nevertheless, it has been proved that this protocol
is not secure [23]. Finally, the GHZs have been experimentally implemented by various means,
e.g., using entanglement swapping starting from three down converters [24], using two pairs of
entangled photons [25], based on dipole-induced transparency in a cavity-waveguide system [26],
in the framework of the superconducting circuits [27] and nuclear magnetic resonance [28].
In this communication, we develop a new protocol using the GHZs. More illustratively, we
have three or more legitimate users and no controllers. The number of the keys, which can be
generated in this protocol, equals the number of the users and/or the number of particles in
the GHZs. In the proposed protocol, we apply the block-data transfer among the users [17].
There are some basic differences between this protocol and the others that were given earlier
3[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], as we will show below. Firstly, the legitimate users can
simultaneously generate various keys. Each user does not need the cooperation of the other users to
obtain these keys. Eavesdroppers can be checked in the two stages of the protocol, which makes the
protocol highly secure. It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous quantum direct commination
between users based on GHZs has been established in [20]. In this protocol, the users can obtain
the messages only when Ailce announces publicly the forms of the initial and final states. Based on
this announcement, Eve can directly obtain most of the messages without using potential attacks.
It is enough for her to compare the initial and final states [23]. This type of attack is called
information leakage attack. The protocol, we present in this paper, is secure against such type of
attack, as we will show next. Moreover, we discuss the security of the protocol against different
types of attacks.
Before starting the description of the protocol we shed some light on the set of the three-particle
GHZs. This set includes eight independent states, which form a complete orthonormal basis as
follows:
|ψ1〉 = 1√2(|000〉 + |111〉), |ψ2〉 =
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉),
|ψ3〉 = 1√2(|100〉 + |011〉), |ψ4〉 =
1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉),
|ψ5〉 = 1√2(|010〉 + |101〉), |ψ6〉 =
1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉),
|ψ7〉 = 1√2(|110〉 + |001〉), |ψ8〉 =
1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉).
(1)
These states can be switched into each other by applying one of the four unitary operators
Iˆ(j), σˆ
(j)
x , iσˆ
(j)
y , σˆ
(j)
z to them, where the superscript j stands for the jth-particle and the notations
have the same standard meaning in the literatures. This fact is the main object in generating the
keys. The users have to agree, in advance, about the following Boolean values:
Iˆ(j) −→ 0, σˆ(j)x −→ 1. (2)
There is one fact we would like to address here: why we do not consider the four-encoding processes
Iˆ(j), σˆ
(j)
x , iσˆ
(j)
y , σˆ
(j)
z ? Actually, sometimes applying two operations on the states |ψj〉 can give the
same results as follows:
Iˆ(2)Iˆ(3)|ψ1〉 = σˆ(2)z σˆ(3)z |ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉
σˆ
(2)
x σˆ
(3)
x |ψ1〉 = σˆ(2)y σˆ(3)y |ψ1〉 = |ψ3〉
(3)
4This, of course, could be a weak point in the decoding process, however, it is a positive point in
the security of the protocol since it confuses eavesdroppers.
Now we are in a position to describe the protocol, which will be discussed in greater details for
three users, namely, Alice, Bob and Charlie. The protocol goes as follows.
Step 1 : Alice prepares a sequence A of n + d + d′ ordered GHZ triplets, each of which has
the form (ak1 , a
k
2 , a
k
3), k = 1, 2, ..., n + d + d
′, where the superscript k denotes the order of the
triplet in the sequence A. These triplets are randomly chosen from the set given by (1), and are
already known to Alice herself. Alice takes one particle a1, a2, a3 from each GHZ triplet to form
three ordered particles sequences Aj = {a1j , a2j , ..., an+d+d
′
j } with j = 1, 2, 3.
Step 2: At the same time Bob and Charlie, in their sites, do the same as Alice. In this case
Bob and Charlie have the sequences Bj = {b1j , b2j , ..., bn+d+d
′
j } and Cj = {c1j , c2j , ..., cn+d+d
′
j } with
j = 1, 2, 3, respectively.
Step 3: Alice transmits the sequences A2 and A3 to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Similarly,
Bob transmits the sequences B1 and B3 to Alice and Charlie, respectively. Charlie transmits C1
and C2 to Alice and Bob. Each sender should inform, via classical channels, the receivers before
the transmission and the receivers should confirm the reception of the particles. This process is
used to avoid unwanted circumstances under which Eve can impersonate one or both of the users.
The transmission of the particles occurs in blocks and the orders of the sequences are not known
for the receivers. These arrangements may increase the security of the protocol.
Step 4: The users start to check the security of the channels to see if the eavesdroppers are
on line or not. This should be independently performed for each sequence. We start with the
Alice’s sequence A = (A1, A2, A3). Bob, say, chooses randomly a large subset d of particles from
the sequence A2 and measures each of them using one of the two bases x or z. Then Bob publicly
tells Alice and Charlie via a classical channel about the positions, the basis and the measurement
outcome for each of the particles. Charlie, using the same bases, measures the corresponding
particles from the sequence A3, and publicly tells the others about the results. After that Alice
applies the same procedure for the particles in the home sequence A1. Consequently, the users can
decide whether there are eavesdroppers in the line or not. Precisely, if the measurement outcomes
are different, then Eve is not on line. Similar procedures have to be executed for the sequences
{B1, B3} and {C1, C2}. At this step, there is no need to evaluate the error rates since the keys
have not been generated yet. The final remark we should stress here is that the user, who has the
home particles, should be the last one executing eavesdropper checking for the set d. This, in turn,
helps in finding out the dishonest user if he or she exists.
5Step 5: At this stage, we assume that each partner has his own key, and he or she wants to
transmit it to the others. Therefore, each one encodes his own key in the particles of the other
partners by means of the operations shown in (2). Each one uses one operator to act simultaneously
on the two particles from the different sequences, however, in the same order. For instance, suppose
that Alice wants to encode the bit 1 in the jth-particle for the other partners. In this case, she
should act by σˆ
(j)
x on the j-th particle in the sequences B1 and C1. Similar procedures have to
be performed in Bob and Charlie sites. During the encoding process the users should be careful
regarding the information and the positions of the particles of the set d′. The reason is that the
users will sacrifice these particles when checking the eavesdroppers in the final step.
Step 6: After completing the encoding process each user transmits back the blocks of parti-
cles (message particles) to the other partners. Of course they should inform each other before
transmission and after the reception of the blocks. At this stage the users obtain their original
particles, but in new forms. For instance, Alice, after a successful transmission, has the sequence
A = {(a11, a′2, a′3), (a21, a
′2
2 , a
′2
3 ), ..., (a
n+d′
1 , a
′n+d′
2 , a
′n+d′
3 )}, where the dash means that these particles
are different from the original ones since now they carry the keys. It is worth mentioning that
the sequences {a′j2 , j = 1, ..., n + d′} and {a
′j
3 , j = 1, ..., n + d
′} include Bob and Charlie keys,
respectively. However, {aj1, j = 1, ..., n + d′} is the home sequence. As Alice, say, prepared these
particles initially she knows them very well. Now Alice performs the GHZs-basis measurement
on the ordered n + d′ GHZs and compares the measurement outputs with the initial forms of the
states to obtain the keys of Bob and Charlie. For instance, if Alice initially prepared one of the
triplet in the state |ψ1〉 and the measurement result is |ψ3〉. From (1) and (2) Alice has the relation
|ψ3〉 = σˆ(2)x σˆ(3)x |ψ1〉. According to the arrangement (2) Alice knows with certainty that Bob and
Charlie bits are 1 and 1, respectively, and so on. At the same time Bob and Charlie perform the
same procedures. At the end of the protocol each user has three keys: his own key and the keys
of the other partners. At this moment there is no overlap between the users since each one has
retrieved his own sequence of the GHZs, however, in the new forms. Thus they cannot check the
eavesdroppers based on the entanglement property, e.g., [10]. In this case, the users can use the
virtue of the set d′. As we have mentioned above, the senders know the positions of the particles
of the set d′ and the information included. Precisely, they designed their keys based on that these
bits will be excluded from the generic keys. To explain this scenario we focus the attention on
the set d′ of Alice. Alice publicly informs Bob and Charlie via a classical channel about the set
d′, i.e. the positions of the particles and the bases which should be used for the measurement but
not the results. Bob and Charlie follow Alice’s prescription and they announce the measurement
6results sequentially. In other words, Bob announces the measurement of the first particle, then
Charlie the second one, then Bob and so on. Such process is sufficient to detect the dishonest user
if any. We proceed, if there are overlaps between the results of the measurements then the key is
secure otherwise they should evaluate the error rate for this key. Then the users should follow the
same steps for the sequences B and C. Comparison among these three error rates drives the users
to choose the most suitable key for the communication. Moreover, based on the positions of the
particles in the set d′ the users can bring some diversions to delude Eve, i.e. by using particular
types of swapping entanglement and/or shifting process for the bits of the final keys. Nevertheless,
they should agree in advance about this scenario.
This protocol can be extended to N parties. In this case, at the end of the protocol, the users
obtain N keys. Each user generates a sequence of N particles in the GHZs, which has the form:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|j1j2...jN 〉+ |j′1j′2...j′N 〉), (4)
where jp, j
′
p, (p = 1, ..., N) are bits 0 or 1 according to the specified states. The users should follow
the same steps discussed above. In this protocol, the users obtain the generic key by making a
comparison among the N keys. The larger the numbers of the keys, the higher the probability of
obtaining a secure key. This is related to the fact that Eve cannot efficiently attack many keys at
the same time. She is vulnerable enough at least for one of the keys.
Now we comment on the security of the proposed protocol. From the above discussion, it is
obvious that we have two levels of security; before and after the encoding process. Generally, Eve
can get information on the keys if she manages to obtain information about the particles before and
after the encoding process. This, of course, requires that the users did not detect her in the step 4.
Suppose that we deal with ideal conditions and Eve managed to attack the travelling particles. We
start the discussion with the double-CNOT attack. This attack does not disturb the channels and
hence the mutual information between different users are unity, i.e., Iij = 1 where i, j = A,B,C,E.
This means that if the users are going to use only a message authentication as a security strategy,
they would never be able to detect this kind of attack. The mechanism of the 2CNOT attack is as
follows: In the forward path, Eve performs a first CNOT gate between the particles in transit from
Alice to Bob and to Charlie (control qubits) and her ancillae (target qubits). The second CNOT
gate is executed in the backward path. Restricting ourselves to Alice’s particles, the scenario of the
2CNOT attack can be explained as follows. Alice keeps the first particle in her site and sends the
second and third ones to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Eve executes her ancillae |0〉E2 |0〉E3 with
7the transit particles and performs the first CNOT gate as:
Ucont(|ψ1〉|0〉E2 |0〉E3 ) = |Ψ1〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉|0〉E2 |0〉|0〉E3 + |1〉|1〉|1〉E2 |1〉|1〉E3 ). (5)
It is obvious that the CNOT gate creates an entangled state composed from the travelling qubits
and the Eve’s ancillae. Suppose that Bob and Charlie act, respectively, by Iˆ(2) and σˆ
(3)
x on their
corresponding particles according to their own keys. Thus we obtain:
Iˆ(2)σˆ(3)x |Ψ1〉 = |Ψ2〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉|0〉E2 |1〉|0〉E3 + |1〉|1〉|1〉E2 |0〉|1〉E3 ). (6)
In the backward path Eve executes the second CNOT gate, which leads to:
Ucont(|Ψ2〉) = |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉|1〉 + |1〉|1〉|0〉) |0〉E2 |1〉E3 = |ψ7〉|0〉E2 |1〉E3 . (7)
It is evident that the generic state is flipped, i.e. |ψ1〉 −→ |ψ7〉. In addition, the generic state
and the Eve ancillae are disentangled. For Eve, it is enough to measure these ancillae in the z
basis to get the information. It is obvious that this information, in some sense, could be sufficient
to give Eve information regarding the keys. We should stress that Eve cannot know the forms of
the generic backward states since she cannot access the home particles. If Eve knows the Boolean
relations given by (2), then she can obtain the keys. This is quite similar to the non-entangled
protocol discussed in [29] for which the 2CONT attack is reasonably efficient. Generally, Eve does
not know any information about the agreement (2) and hence she should take into account the
actions of the operators σˆ
(j)
z and iσˆ
(j)
y . In this regard, the probability to get the key from this
protocol, via the 2CNOT attack, is 25%. This is clear since the applied operation could be, e.g.,
one of the set {Iˆ(2)Iˆ(3), Iˆ(2)σˆ(3)z , σˆ(2)z Iˆ(3), σˆ(2)z σˆ(3)z }. Accordingly, this indicates that the 2CONT
attack cannot give Eve valuable information about the keys.
We draw the attention to the quantum man-in-the-middle attack. The mechanism of this
attack can be explained for Alice’s particles as follows. In the forward path, i.e, Alice transmits
the particles to Bob and Charlie, Eve blocks the the particles, stores them in the memory and sends
instead her particles to Bob and Charlie. In the backward path, i.e. Bob and Charlie transmit
the particles back to Alice, Eve measures these particles to get the encoded information. At this
moment she encodes the same information in the stored particles and passes them back to Alice.
This is a dangerous attack, in particular, when Eve has full control of the classical channel. The
solution against this kind of attack is that the legitimate users should share a prior secret letting
them authenticate the channel and make it reliable when they communicate before and after the
transmission processes. For the protocol under consideration, this attack is not helpful for Eve,
8where the users can detect her through the forward path in the step 4 with high probability. For
instance, suppose that Alice uses the state |ψ1〉, where she keeps the first particle with her and
sends the second and third particles to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Eve has two possibilities for
choosing ancillae, namely, GHZs and z basis states. If Eve uses one of the GHZs as a faked state,
according to the set (1), Eve has a probability of 1/8 to use the correct states. In this case, she has
a probability of 1/3 to keep the correct particle with her pretending to be Alice. In this case, the
probability that Eve is not revealed at all in a step 4, is 1/24. On the other hand, if Eve is not on
the line, the measurements of the users in a control run (for the state |ψ1〉) yield |000〉 and |111〉
with equal probability [20]. Now suppose that Eve uses the faked states from the z basis states,
so what would be the probability to be detected in a control run?. If Eve qubits are one pair of
the set {|0〉B |0〉C , |1〉B |1〉C}, where the subscripts B and C indicate that these particles are sent
to Bob and to Charlie, respectively, the measurement results corresponding to these ancillae are
{(|000〉, |100〉), (|011〉, |111〉)}. Thus Eve will be detected, because her eavesdropping introduces an
error rate equal to 1/2. When Eve’s ancillae are one pair of the set {|0〉B |1〉C , |1〉B |0〉C} the users
detect her with certainty. This shows that the protocol is secure against this attack.
Information leakage attack has been developed in [23] and can be explained as follows: In some
of the GHZ protocols, e.g. [20], the users obtain the keys only when Alice announces publicly its
initial and final states. Thus Eve can easily obtain these results and when comparing them she
obtains the keys. Actually, it has been proved, based on this attack, that Eve can obtain three bits
from the transmitted four bits [23]. It is obvious that the protocol under consideration does not
include such type of announcements and hence it is secure against this type of attack. We conclude
by referring to the intercept-resend and disturbance attacks. They have been already studied in
[20] for the GHZ protocol and showed that it is secure against these attacks. Similar arguments
can be quoted for the proposed protocol. Finally, the security of the ping-pong protocol against
considerable quantum channel losses is discussed in [9]. The current protocol can be treated in a
quite similar way. This is based on the fact that it is enough for Eve to attack one of the travelling
sequences of each users, e.g. A2, B1, C3. If the attention is focused on one qubit of each sequence,
the treatment will be the same as that of the ping-pong protocol [9].
In conclusion, we have presented a protocol based on the entanglement property of the GHZs.
After a complete round, the users would have many keys so that they can choose the relevant one.
There is no announcements about the forms of the states used in the protocol. This improves the
efficiency of the QKD. The proposed protocol is a two-way: In the forward process the senders
transmit blocks of particles to the receivers, who encode the keys in these particles and transmit
9them back (backward process) to the senders. Eavesdroppers have been checked through two
stages. The security has been discussed against different attacks. An important remark, which
guarantees the security of this protocol against considerable number of attacks, is the entanglement.
For protocols operating via entanglement, the secret information is encoded in the whole entangled
state. Consequently, Eve cannot get useful information if she has obtained just a part of the
entangled state. In the under consideration protocol Eve cannot access the particles of the home
sequences, i.e., the particles of A1, B2, C3.
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